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ABSTRACT
Theory suggests that, in the presence of local bias, the price of a stock should be decreasing in the
ratio of the aggregate book value of firms in its region to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors
in its region. We test this proposition using data on U.S. Census regions and states, and find clear-cut
support for it. Most of the variation in the ratio of interest comes from differences across regions in
aggregate  book  value  per  capita.  Regions  with  low  population  density——e.g.,  the  Deep
South——are home to relatively few firms per capita, which leads to higher stock prices via an
“only-game-in-town” effect. This effect is especially pronounced for smaller, less visible firms,
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I.  Introduction 
  A number of recent papers document that investors have a tendency to be strongly locally 
biased in their portfolio choices.  This bias shows up not only as a preference for domestic as 
opposed to foreign stocks (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994)), but perhaps 
more strikingly, as a preference for those domestic stocks that are headquartered close by (Coval 
and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Huberman (2001)).  Both professional 
money managers and individual investors exhibit some degree of local bias, though it is 
substantially stronger among individuals (Zhu (2003)). 
  While the existence of within-country local bias now seems to be incontrovertible, there 
is little evidence regarding its equilibrium asset-pricing implications.
1  In particular, we know of 
no work that attempts to relate the level of a firm’s stock price to market conditions in its home 
locale.
2  Yet basic theoretical considerations suggest that such a link should exist.  The logic is 
most easily seen by considering an extreme case of local preference in which investors only ever 
purchase the stocks of companies headquartered in, say, their home state.  In this case, each state 
is its own autarkic capital market, with a risk premium that is determined—loosely speaking—by 
the ratio of the total supply of shares in the state to the total risk tolerance of investors living in 
the state.  
  In what follows, we investigate this hypothesis.  We begin by constructing a variable we 
call RATIO, which for any given region at any point in time, is equal to the aggregate book value 
                                                 
1 This is in contrast to the large literature that examines the effects of international market segmentation on asset 
prices.  We discuss this literature in detail in Section V below. 
  
2 See however, Coval and Moskowitz (2001), and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2004), who demonstrate that 
investors—both institutions and individuals—earn excess returns from their investments in local stocks.  These 
findings suggest that local bias is associated with some effect on asset prices. 
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of all firms headquartered in the region, divided by the aggregate income of all households living 
in the region.
3  We do this both for individual states, as well as for the nine U.S. Census regions.  
Next, we run cross-sectional regressions of the log of a firm’s market-to-book on RATIO, as 
well as several controls (including firm return on equity, R&D-to-sales, and industry and 
exchange dummies).   Using a sample period that runs from 1970-2001, we find that the RATIO 
variable has a negative impact on stock prices.  The results emerge at both the state and the 
Census-region levels, though they are somewhat stronger in the latter case.  If one goes from the 
Census region with the highest value of RATIO (the Middle Atlantic), to the region with the 
lowest value (the Deep South), holding all else equal, the implied increase in the stock price is 
approximately 7.3 percent.   
  Digging deeper, we find that our results are intimately connected to regional variation in 
population density.  That is, regions with low population density—of which the Deep South is an 
example—tend to have low values of RATIO, which are associated with higher stock prices.  
This is because most of the variation in RATIO across regions is driven by the book value 
component, which is very sensitive to population density.  Specifically, if one rewrites RATIO as 
total book value per capita divided by income per capita, it turns out that both per-capita 
variables are positively related to population density, but that book value per capita is much more 
responsive to density than is income per capita.  In other words, in spite of low per-capita 
income, the Deep South is associated with higher stock prices because of an “only-game-in-
town” effect: any one company headquartered there faces relatively little competition for local 
investors’ dollars, because so few other companies are headquartered there. 
                                                 
3 Household wealth would arguably be a better proxy for risk tolerance than income, but we have more complete 
data on income at the regional level. 
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  Of course, the close correlation between population density and RATIO begs the question 
of whether the former is a variable that can legitimately be excluded from the right-hand side of 
the regression.  In other words, are there reasons to think that population density might proxy for 
some other economic factor that exerts an independent influence on stock prices?  One 
possibility is that regions with low population density have greater future growth prospects, and 
that it is these superior growth prospects that drive higher stock prices.  We attempt to control for 
this possibility by adding to our baseline regressions a series of future-growth variables, such as 
future income growth at the regional level, as well as future sales growth and profitability at the 
firm level.   None of these controls materially alter our basic results.  
  A related concern is that there may be compositional differences in the sorts of firms that 
are located in different parts of the country, and that are not fully captured by SIC-code based 
industry dummies.  For example, it might be that even within an SIC-defined industry, firms 
located in the Deep South use a different production technology—e.g., one that is more or less 
human-capital-intensive—than firms located in the Middle Atlantic, and that these technology 
differences are what lie behind the observed patterns in stock prices.   
  In an effort to come to grips with this issue, we re-run our baseline analysis on a 
subsample of electric utility firms.  The premise here is that electric utilities are a relatively 
homogeneous set of firms with a common technology.  Moreover, due to high effective transport 
costs, electric utilities are necessarily distributed widely across the country, which helps to 
address the concern that firms with different characteristics endogenously select into different 
regions.   Interestingly, our basic results not only hold up for this subsample, the economic 
magnitudes are noticeably stronger: our point estimates suggest that an electric utility located in 
the Deep South has a stock price 14.5 percent higher than one located in the Middle Atlantic.    4
  Finally, another way to make further progress on the identification problem is to test 
some of the theory’s subsidiary implications.  As we demonstrate with the help of a simple 
model, the RATIO variable should be expected to have the largest impact on the prices of those 
firms that are least visible outside of their home regions, and whose shares must therefore be 
absorbed mostly by local investors.  Put another way, even though Microsoft is located in the 
state of Washington, we might not expect its stock price to be too strongly affected by local-
market conditions in Washington, since Microsoft is so well-known to investors everywhere else.  
  Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the effect of RATIO on stock prices is 
significantly greater for smaller firms.  In particular, for firms below the sample median size, a 
move in RATIO from its Middle-Atlantic value to its Deep-South value is associated with a 12.3 
percent increase in stock prices.  By contrast, the corresponding figure for firms above the 
sample median size is only 3.3 percent.  
  The fact that the RATIO variable interacts this way with firm size lends further support to 
our theory, and helps to cut against the alternative that population density—and by extension, 
RATIO—is just capturing some other unspecified regional factor that matters for stock prices.  
More precisely, as long as we are willing to adopt the identifying assumption that this other 
unspecified factor does not have a differential effect across firms of different sizes, the 
interaction results can be seen as decisive. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, we develop a simple 
model that helps to motivate our tests.  In Section III, we describe the data we use, and the 
construction of our principal variables.  The empirical results are presented in Section IV.     
Section V discusses related work, and Section VI concludes.    
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  II.  The Model 
  A.  Basic Assumptions 
  There are N regions of the country.  In each region, there are two kinds of firms: “visible” 
(V) firms and “hometown” (H) firms.  In each region, there are also two kinds of investors: 
“generalists” and “local experts”.  A generalist can only invest in (i.e., is only aware of) visible 
firms, though he is not restricted to those in his region—he can invest in visible firms 
everywhere.  A local expert can also invest in visible firms, and in addition, can invest in less-
well-known hometown firms, but only those hometown firms in his own region. 
  Denote visible firm i, located in region j, by Fij
V.  Analogously, denote hometown firm i, 
located in region j, by Fij
H.  Firm Fij
V has a book value of Bij
V, and will pay a liquidating dividend 
at time 1 of rij
VBij
V, where rij
V–which can be loosely thought of as the firm’s return on book 
equity—is a normally distributed random variable with a mean of Rij
V and a variance that for 
simplicity is normalized to one for all firms.  Similar notation applies for the H firms. 
  All investors are assumed to have constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) utility, and 
the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in region j is given by Tj.  A fraction θ of this risk 
tolerance comes from the generalists, and a fraction (1 – θ) comes from the local experts.  The 
riskless interest rate between time 0 and time 1 is zero. 
    To simplify the analysis, we further assume that across all firms in all regions, the 
realizations of the r’s are perfectly correlated.  This can be thought of as a reduced-form 
approximation to a one-factor arbitrage-pricing-theory (APT) world, as in Ross (1973), where 
even within any single region, there are enough hometown firms that a local expert can create a 
perfectly diversified portfolio that eliminates all idiosyncratic risk.  
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  B.  Prices With Only Hometown Firms 
  To begin, let us consider the simple case where there are only hometown firms—i.e., 
visible firms do not exist, and hence there is no role for the generalists.   We are interested in the 
pricing of hometown firms in a given region j.  Given the perfect-correlation assumption, we can 
aggregate these firms into a single combined firm.  Call the total time-0 market value of this 
combined hometown firm Vj
H.  The expected payoff to this combined firm at time 1 is given by 
∑i (Rij
HBij
H).  Similarly, the variance of the payoff to this combined firm is given by  (∑i Bij
H)
2.  
Since there is total risk tolerance for hometown firms of (1 – θ)Tj  in region j, standard CARA-
normal arguments imply that: 
 
  Vj
H = ∑i (Rij
HBij
H) –  (∑i Bij
H)
2/(1 – θ)Tj        ( 1 )  
   
By symmetry, it follows that the market-to-book ratio for any one hometown firm i, 
denoted by Qij





H –  (∑i Bij
H)/(1 – θ)Tj         ( 2 )  
 
The intuition for equation (2) is straightforward.  The greater the aggregate book value of 
firms in a given region, the more risk local investors have to bear, and consequently, the greater 
                                                 
4 It is easy to see that the firm-level pricing relationship in (2) aggregates up to the region-level relationship in (1).  
In other words, we have that Vj
H = ∑i (Qij
HBij
H). 
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is the discount borne by all firms in that region.
5  Moreover, equation (2) suggests a very direct 
empirical test.  In particular, we have: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Consider a regression of a firm’s market-to-book ratio against: i) its ROE; 
and ii) the ratio of the total dollar book value of firms in its region to some proxy for total 
regional risk tolerance.  We expect the former variable to attract a positive coefficient, and the 
latter to attract a negative coefficient.    
 
To operationalize a test of this hypothesis, we create an empirical measure, RATIO, that 
uses total region income as a proxy for regional risk tolerance.  We also make a few other minor 
modifications (e.g., added controls, and a log transformation of the market-to-book ratio).  But 
our baseline regression specification can be thought of as directly motivated by equation (2). 
The derivation of equation (2) is made particularly easy by the assumption that all firms 
in a region have perfectly correlated returns.  As noted above, this is a shortcut way to 
incorporate the CAPM/APT premise that within a region, investors are fully diversified, and 
hence only care about systematic risk.  But we should emphasize that this sort of CAPM/APT 
approach is not the only way to generate the result.  For example, one might go to the other 
extreme, and assume that all risk is idiosyncratic, and that each local investor only holds a single 
hometown stock, instead of a well-diversified local portfolio.  If it is also the case that the risk 
tolerance devoted to any one stock in a region is proportional to its book value—i.e., that a 
                                                 
5 In the spirit of a segmented-market CAPM or APT, it is straightforward to extend the model to a setting where 
individual stocks in a region have different loadings on the  market factor—i.e., different betas.  In this case, the 
price discount for a given stock depends on  its own beta, multiplied by a region-level discount factor like that in 
equation (2).  However, since we do not test the beta-related implications of the model, we suppress them for 
simplicity.  In other words, we treat all stocks as if they have betas of one. 
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bigger company has a greater probability of getting noticed and hence a larger investor base—a 
pricing formula identical to that in equation (2) once again emerges. 
 
  C.  Prices With Hometown Firms and Visible Firms 
  We now turn to the case where there are both hometown and visible firms, and both 
local-expert and generalist investors.  To solve the model in this case, we conjecture the 
following outcome: i) generalists absorb all the shares of visible firms; and ii) local experts 
absorb all the shares of their respective hometown firms.  With this conjecture in place, it is easy 
to calculate the prices of the different types of firms.  The conjectured outcome will then only be 
an equilibrium only if, given these prices, local experts choose not to invest at all in visible firms 
because these firms are too expensive; we will have to come back and verify the conditions 
under which this holds. 
  If local investors do indeed restrict themselves to holding only hometown firms, the 
pricing of these hometown firms is exactly as before, and continues to be given by equation (2).  
Analogously, if visible firms are held only by generalists, we can calculate the market-to-book 




V –  (∑j ∑i Bij
V)/(θ∑j Tj )        ( 3 )  
 
Intuitively, the difference between equations (2) and (3) is that the generalists pool their 
risk tolerance together across all the regions, but at the same time they have to absorb the book 
value of all visible firms across all regions.   9
In order for this all to be an equilibrium, we require that the risk premium earned by local 
experts be greater in every region than that earned by generalists.  In this way, the local experts 
will stick to their hometown stocks, and not invest in visible stocks, as conjectured.




H)/(1 – θ)Tj  >  (∑j ∑i Bij
V)/(θ∑j Tj ) for all j.           ( 4 )  
 
This condition is most easily satisfied if: i) θ is large, in which case there are a lot of 
generalists, which pushes down the expected return to visible stocks; or ii) the book value of 
hometown stocks is high relative to the book value of visible stocks, which pushes up the 
expected return to hometown stocks. 
Assuming that (4) does hold, Hypothesis 1 continues to apply as stated above, although 
we must now note two caveats.  First, if we use observations on all firms in the regression, we 
will be blurring together the hometown firms—for which the prediction holds—and the visible 
firms, for which it does not hold.  Second, even focusing on observations corresponding to 
hometown firms, equation (2) tells us that what should go in the numerator of the theoretically 
ideal ratio variable is the aggregate book value of hometown firms in a region, which we cannot 
measure.  So when we use the book value of all firms in a region (both visible and hometown) to 
build our empirical RATIO measure, this constitutes a form of measurement error, which will 
bias our estimates downwards.  This sort of measurement error will be less of a problem to the 
extent that ∑i Bij
H and ∑i Bij
V are highly correlated at the regional level. 
In addition to Hypothesis 1, we now also have: 
                                                 
6 We also need to assume that local experts cannot short the more expensive visible stocks; otherwise, given our 
perfect-correlation assumption, it would be a riskless arbitrage for them to do so while buying local stocks. 
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Hypothesis 2:  Consider a regression of a firm’s market-to-book ratio against: i) its ROE; 
and ii) the ratio of the total dollar book value of firms in its region to some proxy for total 
regional risk tolerance.  We expect the negative coefficient on the latter variable to be larger in 
absolute magnitude for hometown firms than for visible firms. 
 
In the literal context of the model, Hypothesis 2 emerges very starkly, since all visible 
firms trade in the national market and have exactly the same risk premium.  This fact, which is 
apparent from equation (3), implies that for visible firms, the regression coefficient on the ratio 
variable should be exactly zero.   
The model also makes a third prediction, which is built in by virtue of the assumption 
that condition (4) holds: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Controlling for ROE, we expect visible firms to have higher values of 
market-to-book than hometown firms. 
 
The proposition that visibility increases stock prices is essentially a restatement of 
Merton’s (1987) well-known argument.  Although this proposition seems eminently reasonable, 
we do not consider it further in what follows, and instead focus our efforts on Hypotheses 1 and 
2.  We do so for a couple of reasons.  First of all, there is already a large literature on the stock-
price implications of visibility.
7  Second, our empirical framework is not well-suited to dealing 
with the obvious endogeneity problems that accompany any direct attempt to test Hypothesis 3.  
                                                 
7Empirical work on this topic includes Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Botosan (1997), Amihud, Mendelson and 
Uno (1999), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and Brennan and Tamarowski (2003). 
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For any measure of visibility that one can think of—and absent a convincing instrument—there 
is always going to be the question of whether visibility causes higher stock prices, or vice-versa.
8    
 
  III.  Data 
  A.  Sources 
Our data on personal income and other regional and state demographic variables come 
from a database produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the Personal Income and 
Population Summary Estimates.  It is available on the BEA’s website, www.bea.doc.gov, going 
back to 1969.  We limit our analysis to the time period from 1970 through 2001. 
Our data on firms come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
COMPUSTAT.  From CRSP, we obtain stock prices and shares outstanding for NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ stocks.  From COMPUSTAT, we obtain annual information on a variety of 
accounting variables, as well the locations of  firms’ headquarters.  To be included in our sample, 
a firm must first have the requisite financial data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT, and must have 
headquarters in the lower 48 states or in the District of Columbia (i.e., we drop firms located in 
Alaska and Hawaii).  
When we run our regressions, we exclude observations on firms with book equity values 
of less than 10 million dollars, as well as those with one-digit SIC codes of 6, which are in the 
financial-services industry.  However, the book values of these firms are kept for the purposes of 
computing the aggregate book value of firms in a region, which is a key component of our 
RATIO variable.  
                                                 
8 Note that the endogeneity of visibility is less of a problem in the interactive type of specification suggested by 
Hypothesis 2.  Here, we will be on safe ground so long as the reverse-causality effect of stock prices on visibility 
does not differ across regions in a particular way. 
   12
 
  B.  Variable Definitions 
  The market equity value of a firm (M), defined as the combined value of all common 
stock classes outstanding, is taken from CRSP as of fiscal year end.  For the book equity value 
(B), we use COMPUSTAT data item 60.  Our primary dependent variable is the log of the ratio 
of market equity to book equity, i.e., log(M/B).  We take logs because the raw market-to-book 
ratio is highly skewed, and the log transformation results in a variable that is much closer to 
being symmetrically distributed.  However, we obtain similar (albeit somewhat less precisely 
estimated) results if we instead work with the raw market-to-book ratio.  Alternatively, we can 
use the book-to-market ratio as the dependent variable, which also leads to results very similar to 
those we report below, though of course with all of the signs reversed.  Finally, we have also 
experimented with an entirely different valuation measure, a firm’s cashflow-to-price ratio, C/M, 
where cashflow C is net income (item 172) plus depreciation (item 14).  As we describe in more 
detail below, this too leads to the same qualitative results.  
The BEA database reports total personal income by state and breaks the personal income 
down by its various parts, including dividend income. Our main independent variable of interest, 
RATIO, is the ratio of total book equity in a region to total personal income in that region.  In 
calculating personal income, we exclude dividend income, on the notion that keeping it in might 
induce an artificial, hard-wired relationship between RATIO and stock prices.
9  We calculate 
RATIO in two ways, by Census region (nine regions in all) and by state.  The BEA database also 
                                                 
9 If, controlling for ROE, higher dividends are associated  with higher stock prices, it is conceivable that a region 
with a lot of dividend income—and hence a lower value of RATIO, if dividends are included in the calculation of 
RATIO—would show up as having higher valuations on average. 
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reports per capita income and population density by state, which we can aggregate up to get 
analogs for Census regions.  
A firm’s return on book equity (ROE) is its net income (COMPUSTAT data item 172) 
divided by its previous-year book equity (item 60 lagged one year).  R&D expenditures and sales 
are items 46 and 12, respectively, and we use these to create an R&D-to-sales ratio. The log 
market-to-book ratio, ROE and R&D-to-sales ratio are all winsorized at the one-percent and 99-
percent levels.  When the R&D variable is missing, we set its value to zero; however, we also 
include on the right-hand-side of all our regressions a dummy variable that equals one when a 
firm does not report R&D.  
For the purposes of one of our robustness checks, we create a dummy variable that equals 
one for a conglomerate, which we define as a firm that operates in more than one business 
segment.  Information regarding firm segments on COMPUSTAT only begins in 1983.  So our 
analysis involving this variable is limited to the sub-sample that runs from 1983 to 2001.  If a 
firm is missing segment data, we assume that it is not a conglomerate, and set the dummy 
variable to zero.  
In another robustness check, we drop observations corresponding to any firms that belong 
to a dominant industry in its region.  For each region (whether it be a Census region or a state) 
and for each year, we calculate the book value of firms in each two-digit SIC industry, and we 
deem an industry to be dominant if it accounts for more than 10 percent of the total book value in 
that region.  Note that we only drop these dominant-industry firms from the left-hand-side of our 
regressions, but keep them in when calculating the total book equity of firms in a Census region 
or state. 
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C.  Anatomy of the RATIO Variable 
Table 1 provides some summary statistics for the RATIO variable.  In Panel A, we 
display the value of RATIO for each Census region once every five years between 1970 and 
2001, along with both cross-sectional and time-series means and standard deviations.  As can be 
seen, the Middle Atlantic region has consistently had the highest values of RATIO, averaging 
0.94 over the sample period.  New England runs a close second, with an average RATIO of 0.87.  
At the other extreme, the Deep South has the lowest average value over the entire sample period, 
at 0.21, though it has been catching up over time:  in 1970, the Deep South was far behind all 
other regions at 0.07, while by 2000, it had passed the Mountain region, at 0.50 vs. 0.34. 
In Panel B, we show the analogous data at the state level.  In keeping with the patterns 
seen in Panel A, states like Connecticut, New York, Michigan and Illinois are among those with 
the highest values of RATIO, while states like Wyoming, Montana, West Virginia and Vermont 
rank near the bottom.  Even a superficial glance suggests that there seems to be a close link 
between the RATIO variable and population density. 
In order to better understand what is driving the RATIO variable, we take logs and write 
the log of RATIO as equal to the log of regional book value per capita,  minus the log of regional 
income per capita.  Using this decomposition, we can, in any yearly cross-section, ask how much 
of the variance of the log of RATIO is coming from each of these two terms.  The answer is that 
the lion’s share comes from the log of book value per capita: at the Census region level, an 
average of 74 percent of the total variance of the log of RATIO comes from the log of book 
value per capita, while at the state level, the corresponding figure is 79 percent.
10   
                                                 
10 These figures represent the time-series mean values of cross-sectional variance decompositions done on an annual 
basis. 
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Table 2 relates this decomposition explicitly to regional differences in population density.  
We run annual cross-sectional regressions with three different dependent variables: i) the log of 
RATIO; ii) the log of  book value per capita; and iii) the log of income per capita.  In each case, 
the sole explanatory variable is regional population density.  In Panel A, the regressions are run 
on Census-region-level data, and in Panel B, they are run on state-level data. 
In column 1 of Panel A, it can be seen that the log of RATIO is highly correlated with 
population density; this confirms the informal impressions from Table 1.  The R-squared in the 
univariate regression averages 0.41, which is equivalent to a correlation coefficient of 0.64.   
Columns 2 and 3 demonstrate that both components of the log of RATIO are also positively 
correlated with population density, but that the book value term is considerably more sensitive to 
population density than the income term, with an average regression coefficient of 0.608 vs. 
0.287.
11  In other words, as population density goes up, both book value per capita and income 
per capita rise too, but the former effect is much stronger than the latter, so that on net, RATIO 
increases as well.  The patterns are qualitatively similar in Panel B, with the state-level data, 
albeit muted: for example, the R-squared in the regression of the log of RATIO on population 
density now averages 0.16, corresponding to a correlation coefficient of 0.40. 
With a little reflection, the strong effect of population density on book value per capita—
and, ultimately, on RATIO—makes intuitive sense.  There are many reasons why firms would 
prefer, all else equal, to locate their headquarters and/or their major operating facilities in densely 
populated areas: better infrastructure (e.g., large international airports); access to a deeper and 
higher-quality labor pool; etc.  Indeed, these sorts of agglomeration effects provide perhaps the 
most natural way of thinking about the root source of variation in our RATIO measure. 
                                                 
11 Again, these figures represent the time-series means of cross-sectional regression coefficients. 
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IV.  Empirical Results 
A.  Baseline Specification 
Our baseline specification is designed to test Hypothesis 1.  The dependent variable is the 
log of the market-to-book ratio for a firm.  The independent variables are RATIO, firm ROE, 
firm R&D-to-sales, a dummy for whether the firm reports R&D expenditures, a set of 2-digit 
SIC industry dummies, and dummies for exchange listing (NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ).  In one 
variant, RATIO is measured at the Census-region level, while in another, it is measured at the 
state level. 
To further protect against hardwiring, we recalculate the RATIO variable for each firm-
year observation so that the numerator of RATIO omits the book value of the firm in question.  
That is, for an observation on firm i in year t,  the corresponding RATIO variable includes the 
book value of all the other firms in i’s region in year t, but does not include i’s book value.  This 
ensures that when we obtain a negative coefficient in a regression of log market-to-book against 
RATIO, it is not coming simply because the same book value is in the denominator of the left-
hand-side variable and the numerator of the right-hand-side variable.  It also implies that while 




B.  Statistical Inference: Methodological Issues 
Given the nature of our data, we need to think carefully about the correlation structure of 
the residuals, and about the resulting implications for how we calculate standard errors.  First, 
                                                 
12 As it turns out, this adjustment is of no consequence.  We obtain essentially identical results if we make no 
adjustment to the RATIO variable and use exactly the same value for all firms in a given region/year cell.   17
note that in any given year, we only have nine effectively independent observations on RATIO if 
we are working at the Census-region level, and 49 if we are working at the state level.  In other 
words, we should expect to have a high degree of cross-correlation in the residuals at a given 
point in time. 
As one method for dealing with this cross-correlation, we take a Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
approach, running a separate cross-sectional regression each year from 1970 to 2001—a total of 
32 regressions in all.  We then compute the means of the annual regression coefficients.  Finally, 
we evaluate the statistical significance of the means based on an in-sample estimate of the time-
series variance of the annual coefficients, one that adjusts for serial correlation in these 
coefficients.  
However, as Petersen (2005) points out, the Fama-MacBeth approach—even with a 
serial-correlation adjustment—can lead to understated standard errors if there are fixed or 
slowly-decaying effects in the data.  To see this point most clearly, consider an extreme example 
where the data for each of the 32 years in our sample are literally identical.  In this case, the 
annual regression coefficients will also be identical, so the Fama-MacBeth method will 
inappropriately generate estimated standard errors that approach zero. 
As an alternative that does better in the presence of fixed or slowly-decaying effects, 
Petersen (2005) suggests the use of a single pooled regression with clustered standard errors.  To 
implement this procedure, we pool all the data, add year dummies, and also allow each of the 
control variables other than RATIO to take on a different value each year  (i.e., these controls are 
all interacted with year dummies).  We then cluster the standard errors at the region level.   
To check that this approach is robust in the presence of fixed effects in our setting, we try 
the following experiment.  First, we take a single year at random from our dataset, and run the   18
regression for just that year in isolation.  Then, we create a fake 30-year panel which consists of 
30 repetitions of that same one year, and apply our pooled-plus-clustering specification to the 
fake panel.  Ideally, and in contrast to the Fama-MacBeth procedure, we should get the same 
standard errors with the one-year regression as with the fake 30-year panel, because there is no 
more information in the latter—i.e., the method should not be fooled by the presence of more 
years’ worth of observations if these observations are purely redundant.  And indeed, this is what 
happens.
13 We conclude that Petersen’s (2005) arguments carry over to our setting, and that—
unlike Fama-MacBeth—the pooled-plus-clustering methodology is robust to even the most 
extreme kind of fixed effects. 
As a final reality check on our standard errors, we also try a “collapsed” version of our 
baseline specification.  We implement this as follows.  First, every year, we run a cross-sectional 
regression of log market-to-book against all of our control variables except RATIO, and use this 
regression to generate firm-level residual values of log market-to-book.  Next, we collapse these 
firm-level residuals at the region-year level—i.e., we compute an equal-weighted average of the 
firm-level residuals within each region-year cell.  In the case of Census regions, this gives us 9 
observations on residual log market-to-book each year—one for each Census region—and a total 
of 288 observations for the entire 32-year sample period (288 = 9x32).  We then run a simple 
panel regression on these 288 observations, with RATIO and year dummies as the only right-
hand side variables, again clustering the standard errors at the region level to account for any 
serial correlation in the residuals.   
                                                 
13 For example, if we run the regression for just the single year 1995, we get a point estimate for the coefficient on 
RATIO of -0.145, with a standard error of 0.070.  If we run the regression for a fake panel with 30 repetitions of the 
1995 data, we get an identical point estimate, and an almost-identical standard error of 0.069.  Similar results obtain 
if we start with any other year in our sample period. 
   19
This approach is appealing because it makes transparently clear that, in computing the 
standard errors, we are not claiming to have anything more than 9 independent observations per 
period.  And comfortingly, it leads to results that are very close to those from the pooled 
regressions.  Moreover, a modification of the collapsing technique also allows us to provide a 
simple graphical illustration of our results, which we will turn to shortly.  
 
C.  Detailed Results from Baseline Specifications 
Table 3 gives a detailed overview of our baseline results.  In Panel A, RATIO is 
measured at the Census-region level, while in Panel B, it is measured at the state level.  Consider 
first Panel A.  When we use the Fama-MacBeth approach, the coefficient on RATIO takes on the 
predicted negative sign in 31 of the 32 regressions.  Across all of the regressions, the mean value 
of the coefficient is -0.099, with a Fama-MacBeth (serial-correlation adjusted) standard error of 
0.008.  Not surprisingly, the coefficients on ROE and R&D-to-sales are both positive in each of 
the 32 regressions.
14   
As noted above, there is a concern that in our setting the Fama-MacBeth approach may 
produce understated standard errors.  The results from the pooled and collapsed regressions bear 
out this concern.  Although the point estimates for the coefficient on RATIO are very similar to 
those from the Fama-MacBeth specification, at -0.097 and -0.092 respectively, the standard 
errors are substantially larger, at 0.029 and 0.030.  Nevertheless, even with these more 
                                                 
14 Using a Fama-MacBeth approach to inference is not as well-motivated in the case of the ROE and R&D-to-sales 
variables.  With RATIO, there is an obvious concern about cross-correlated residuals, since there are effectively 
only nine distinct values of RATIO in a given cross-section; hence the motivation for the Fama-MacBeth technique.  
With ROE and R&D-to-sales, it is almost certainly the case that the Fama-MacBeth test statistics vastly understate 
the confidence one should have in the hypothesis that the true coefficients are in fact positive. 
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conservative standard errors, the coefficient on RATIO remains statistically significant at the 
one-percent level.   
In much of what follows, we save space by focusing on the results from the pooled 
versions of the regressions.   Again, this appears to be a conservative approach in our particular 
context, and one that is roughly equivalent to the collapsing technique. 
The collapsing methodology is however especially useful for providing some further 
intuition into why, in spite of all the concerns about both cross-correlation and time-series 
correlation, we are able to obtain statistically significant estimates for the coefficient on RATIO.  
In Figure 1, we take the collapsing approach a step further, by averaging the data over time.  For 
example, in Panel A, we plot the time-averaged value of residual log market-to-book for each 
Census region against the time-averaged value of RATIO, where this averaging is done over the 
entire sample period.  In Panels B-G, we undertake a similar exercise, but average only over 
five-year intervals (e.g., 1970-74, 1975-79, etc.).    
Thus in each case, we have boiled all the data down to just nine observations—
discarding, among other things, any potentially useful information that might be embodied in 
year-to-year variation in RATIO.  Yet as can be seen from the scatterplots, these nine 
observations alone tell a pretty clear story in most of the sample periods.  For example, for the 
full sample, a regression based on the nine data points in Panel A yields a coefficient on RATIO 
of -0.080, a standard error of 0.036, and a t-statistic of 2.22.  Thus it should not be too surprising 
that no matter how stringently we adjust our standard errors to account for various forms of 
correlation in the data—i.e., no matter how much we discount the effective number of 
independent observations—we still obtain statistically significant results.   21
To get a sense of economic magnitudes, recall that the average value of RATIO in the 
Middle Atlantic is 0.94, while the average value in the Deep South is 0.21.  Thus if a firm moves 
from the Middle Atlantic to the Deep South, holding all else equal, the implied increase in the 
log of market-to-book based on the pooled estimate is 0.071 (0.097 x (0.94 – 0.21) = 0.071), i.e., 
the firm’s stock price goes up by about 7.3 percent.  
In Panel B of Table 3, everything else is the same, except we now measure RATIO at the 
state level.  In this case, the coefficient on RATIO is negative in 29 of 32 years; it has a mean 
value of -0.039 and a Fama-MacBeth standard error of 0.006.  The pooled specification yields a 
similar point estimate of -0.036 and a substantially-increased standard error of 0.019, which 
implies that the estimate is significant at only the 10 percent level.  For the collapsed 
specification, the coefficient on RATIO is -0.041 with a standard error of 0.022, which is again 
significant at the 10 percent level. Thus overall, the state-level results are qualitatively similar to, 
but statistically weaker than, those at the Census-region level.  
The associated economic effects are somewhat smaller as well.  If we go from the state 
with the third-highest average value of RATIO (New York, at 1.28) to the state with the third-
lowest average value (Montana, at 0.05), the implied increase in a firm’s stock price based on the 
pooled specification is now 4.5 percent.  This attenuation of our results relative to the Census-
region case is consistent with the notion that investors’ preferences for local stocks may extend 
somewhat beyond the confines of their home states, so that Census region is a better—though 
certainly not perfect—approximation to the relevant neighborhood.  Alternatively, as we discuss 
below, it is likely that the state-level observations of RATIO are subject to a form of 
measurement error, and that this measurement-error problem is mitigated when we aggregate 
states up into Census regions.   22
 
D.  Alternative Specifications 
In Table 4, we experiment with a number of variations on our baseline specification.  For 
compactness, we now display in each row of the table only the summary estimates associated 
with the pooled regression model.  As before, Panel A uses the Census-region version of RATIO, 
while Panel B uses the state version.  We begin our discussion with Panel A. 
In Row 1 of Panel A, we reproduce our baseline pooled-regression result—a coefficient 
on the RATIO variable of -0.097.  In Row 2, we add to the regression region per-capita income.  
This variable is itself completely insignificant, while the coefficient on RATIO is virtually 
unchanged, at -0.094.  Intuitively, this tells us that our results for RATIO are driven almost 
entirely by variation in the numerator (i.e., book value per capita) and that there is not enough 
variation in the denominator (per-capita income) to isolate its separate contribution.  Such a 
conclusion is not surprising, given the variance decomposition of RATIO discussed above.  
In Row 3, we add to the baseline specification region population density.  This variable 
not only attracts a significant negative coefficient, it also completely drives out RATIO.   How 
should one interpret this result?  We can imagine two possible views.  On the one hand, it can be 
argued that there is no a priori theoretical reason for population density to go in these 
regressions.  Thus to the extent that it enters significantly, it must be because it effectively cleans 
up a measurement error problem in our RATIO variable.  Recall that in the numerator of RATIO, 
we have the book value of firms headquartered in a given region.  However, it is entirely 
possible that what matters for local bias is not merely the location of a firm’s headquarters, but 
rather the extent of its operating presence (e.g., major manufacturing plants, large R&D 
campuses) in a given regional economy.  Moreover, it may also be that a region’s population   23
density better captures the aggregate presence of publicly listed firms than does the book value 
of firms that are nominally headquartered there.
15   
The state of Delaware provides a stark illustration of this point.  Over the entire sample 
period, Delaware has the second-highest average value of RATIO among all states, at 1.84.  It 
seems likely that this high value is attributable in part to Delaware’s uniquely dominant role in 
the market for firm incorporations, which might be expected to lead a disproportionate number 
of firms to also list their nominal headquarters as being in Delaware, even if they do not have 
much of a real operating presence in the state.
16   
Under this measurement-error interpretation, it is neither surprising, nor bad news for our 
theory, that population density takes out RATIO in an OLS horse race. A more problematic 
alternative is that population density is a proxy for some other omitted factor that does 
legitimately belong in the regression.  For example, it may be that regions with low population 
density have the greatest potential for future growth, which would naturally translate into higher 
expected cashflows for the firms located there.   Fortunately, it is possible to address this sort of 
alternative hypothesis directly, which we do in Row 4-7.  In Row 4, we add to the baseline 
specification a term for future region-level income growth, defined as the rate of growth of total 
region income over years t+1 through t+3.
17  This future-growth variable attracts a positive 
coefficient, as expected, but the impact on RATIO is negligible—its coefficient drops in absolute 
value from -0.097 to -0.094, and it remains strongly significant.  In Rows 5 and 6, we add in turn 
                                                 
15 As discussed above, there are many reasons why firms would want to locate their major facilities in densely 
populated areas. 
 
16 See Bebchuk and Cohen (2003), who document that as of 1999, 58 percent of all public firms were incorporated 
in Delaware. 
 
17 We have experimented with variations on the timing—e.g., going five or ten years out when measuring future 
income growth—with little difference to the results. 
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to the baseline regression average future firm ROE, and future firm sales growth, again measured 
in each case over years t+1 through t+3. While both of these future firm-level variables have 
strong positive effects on stock prices, neither appreciably alters the estimated coefficient on 
RATIO. 
Finally, in Row 7, we add all three future-growth terms to the regression simultaneously.  
Even in this case, RATIO is only modestly changed, at -0.081.  Overall, these variations lead us 
to conclude that population density is probably not proxying for any kind of directly value-
relevant factor—at least not one that shows up in future cashflows.  
In Row 8, we return to our baseline specification, but drop all observations corresponding 
to those firms which belong to “dominant” industries in their region.  More precisely, we drop 
any firm whose 2-digit SIC industry accounts for more than 10 percent of the total book value in 
a region.  (We continue to keep these firms for the purposes of calculating the RATIO variable, 
however.)  The idea here is that if there is still some relevant uncontrolled-for factor at the 
regional level, it is likely to have more of an effect on dominant-industry firms.  For example, 
suppose that—in the spirit of a multifactor APT—there is an extra risk premium on stocks that 
are heavily exposed to auto-industry risk.  It just so happens that Michigan has one of the highest 
average values of RATIO in the sample, at 1.13. So one might conceivably argue that perhaps 
Michigan firms have relatively low market-to-book values not because of a RATIO effect,  but 
because of their high loading on auto-industry risk.   By eliminating dominant-industry firms, we 
throw out any auto firms that happen to be located in Michigan, which should tend to mitigate 
this type of problem.
18  As it turns out, this adjustment has little effect on our results; the 
coefficient on RATIO falls only slightly, to -0.091. 
                                                 
18 When applied to Michigan, our dominant-industry screen excludes the 2-digit SIC industry described as 
“transportation manufacturing”, which includes automakers.   25
In Rows 9-11, we experiment with three other controls that might be expected to have 
some impact on market-to-book ratios: a conglomerate dummy, the log of firm sales, and an 
S&P 500 index dummy.  None of these controls makes any appreciable difference to the 
coefficient on the RATIO variable.
19   
The patterns in Panel B of Table 4, which uses the state-level measure of RATIO, are 
generally quite similar to those in Panel A, in the sense that none of the variations lead to much 
change in the coefficient on RATIO from its baseline value of -0.036.
20 The one noteworthy 
exception occurs in Row 3, the horse race between RATIO and population density.  In contrast to 
what we saw in the Census-region data, the coefficient on RATIO now only drops modestly—
from -0.036 to -0.029—with the addition of population density. As a purely mechanical matter, 
population density has less scope for taking out RATIO at the state level, simply because the 
correlation between these two variables is not as strong as at the Census-region level (as seen in 
Table 2). 
In addition to the variations reported in Table 4, we have experimented with several other 
robustness checks.  Perhaps most notably, we have redone everything in Tables 3 and 4 with an 
alternative valuation measure on the left-hand-side of the regressions: the ratio of cashflow to 
market value.  The results run closely parallel to those for the log of market-to-book (though of 
course all the signs are reversed).  In terms of economic magnitudes, the pooled regression 
coefficients imply that as we move from the Middle Atlantic to the Deep South, a firm’s 
cashflow-to-price ratio falls by 0.0078.  Relative to the sample median cashflow-to-price ratio of 
                                                 
19 The coefficient on the S&P dummy is surprisingly large, at 0.171.  But note that this does not imply that the 
causal effect of S&P inclusion on stock prices is on the order of 17 percent.  It may just be that a high market 
capitalization is a criterion for S&P inclusion, above and beyond a high book value.  We have also experimented 
with a number of other controls such as firm age and found similar results. 
 
20 As might be expected from the baseline results, the statistical significance of the various state-level regressions in 
Panel B of Table 4 is generally less impressive.  Of the 11 regressions, three produce coefficients on RATIO that are 
significant at the 5 percent level, and four others produce coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent level.    26
0.120, this is a 6.5 percent effect, very close to the 7.3 percent effect obtained from the 
comparable specification for the log of market-to-book.
21   
 
E.  Evidence From Electric Utilities 
One potential objection to our results thus far goes as follows.  Firms’ locations are the 
product of an endogenous choice, and even within an SIC-code-defined industry, there may be 
firms with different technologies that imply different optimal locations.  For example, a firm 
whose strategy relies heavily on the human capital of computer scientists is presumably more 
likely to locate where such scientists are abundant, say in the Boston area or Silicon Valley.  In 
contrast, a firm whose technology is relatively land-intensive is more likely to go where real 
estate is cheap.  To the extent that these factors are also correlated with valuations—e.g., human-
capital-intensive firms trade at a discount—our inferences could be affected. 
In an effort to confront this problem, we re-run our baseline regressions on the subsample 
of electric utility firms.  Our premise here is twofold.  First, electric utilities are likely to have 
relatively homogeneous production technologies across different parts of the country.  Second, 
the fact that there are effectively prohibitive transport costs in this industry implies that the 
endogenous location-selection effect is unlikely to be at work.  Simply put, each region of the 
country has to have to have its own locally-based utilities; there is no scope for all firms in the 
industry to move, e.g., to the Deep South because land or unskilled labor there is cheaper.  
Our sample of electric utilities is drawn from firms in SIC codes 4911 (“establishments 
engaged in the generation, transmission and/or distribution of electric energy for sale”) and 4931 
                                                 
21 Two details about our cashflow-to-price regressions are worth noting.  First, any negative values of the cashflow-
to-price ratio are reset to zero. Second, given that the left-hand-side variable now includes a measure of profitability, 
we drop ROE from the right-hand-side of the regressions.  
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(“establishments primarily engaged in providing electric services in combination with other 
services, with electric services as the major part though less than 95 percent of the total”).   There 
are roughly 100 such firms in the sample in any given year, with some year-to-year variation.
22  
And, as expected, these firms are widely distributed across different regions of the country.
23 
Table 5 presents the results that emerge when our baseline pooled regression 
specification is applied to the electric-utility subsample.  At the Census-region level, the 
coefficient on RATIO is -0.186.  This estimate is substantially higher than the corresponding 
full-sample figure of -0.097, and, in spite of the much-reduced sample size, it is statistically 
significant at the one-percent level.   In economic terms, the coefficient implies that an electric 
utility located in the Deep South has a stock price 14.5 percent higher than one located in the 
Middle Atlantic, all else equal.  These numbers would seem to constitute a strong argument 
against the claim that our previous findings are the product of some sort of endogenous location-
selection mechanism.
24  
Panel H of Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of our Census-region-level results 
for electric utilities, using the same collapsing/time-averaging technique over the full sample 
period as in Panel A of the figure.  As can be seen, the scatterplot is very striking.  The nine 
individual observations hug the regression line closely, producing a point estimate of -0.239 for 
                                                 
22 There are 94 electric utilities in the sample in 1970, 109 in 1975, 110 in 1980, 113 in 1985, 105 in 1990, 98 in 
1995, and 74 in 2001. 
 
23 Of the 74 electric utilities in the sample in 2001, 8 were in the New England region, 9 in the Middle Atlantic, 12 
in the Midwest, 12 in the Plains, 14 in the Atlantic Coast, 3 in the Deep South, 6 in the Southern Plains, 6 in the 
Mountain, and 4 in the Pacific. 
 
24 Similarly large magnitudes emerge if we use cashflow-to-price as the dependent variable in our regressions for 
electric utilities: for Census regions, the pooled coefficient on RATIO in such a regression is 0.026 (with a standard 
error of 0.015); this is more than double the corresponding figure of 0.011 (with a standard error of 0.003) for the 
sample of all firms. 
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the coefficient on RATIO, with a standard error of 0.074.  Thus even with this most conservative 
approach to inference, the results for electric utilities are remarkably clear-cut. 
At the state level, the coefficient on RATIO for electric utilities is again higher than in 
the corresponding full-sample case, at  -0.051 as compared to -0.036.  However the estimate is 
not statistically significant.  This may be due to the simple fact that with such a small number of 
firms in the utility sample, there are many states (roughly ten in a typical year) with no 
observations at all, which further compromises the already-low power of the state-level tests.  
 
F.  The Interaction of RATIO and Visibility 
We now turn to our tests of Hypothesis 2, which suggests that the RATIO variable should 
have a stronger effect on the prices of less visible firms.  To operationalize this hypothesis, we 
proxy for visibility with firm size.  Specifically, we create a small-firm indicator that equals one 
when firm size, as measured by sales, is below the sample median value in a given year.  We 
then take our baseline pooled regression specification from Table 3, and add two new terms: the 
small-firm dummy, and the interaction of this dummy with RATIO.  Our interest is in the 
interaction term, which we predict will attract a negative coefficient.  
Table 6 presents the results.  Row 1 uses the Census-region measure of RATIO, and Row 
2 uses the state measure.  In Row 1, the coefficient on RATIO is -0.045, and the coefficient on 
the interaction of RATIO and the small-firm dummy is -0.114, with the latter being statistically 
significant. These estimates imply that, for a low-visibility (i.e., small) firm, moving from the 
Middle Atlantic to the Deep South is associated with a 12.3 percent increase in the stock price.  
In contrast, for a high-visibility (i.e., large) firm, the effect is only 3.3 percent.    29
In Row 2, with state-level data,  the coefficient on RATIO is -0.024, and the coefficient 
on the interaction of RATIO and the small-firm dummy is -0.029, suggesting that the effect of 
RATIO is more than doubled for small firms as compared to big firms.  However, in this case the 
interaction term is not statistically significant. 
In addition to firm size, we have experimented with two other measures of visibility: i) 
the total number of shareholders that a firm has; and ii) an indicator for the presence of a top-200 
“megabrand” as reported by the trade publication Advertising Age (which in turn bases its 
megabrand classification on total media advertising expenditures).   Both of these variables yield 
strong interaction effects of the predicted sign in the Census-level data, especially the megabrand 
variable, which generates a very large interaction coefficient.
25  However, because of collinearity 
and because we have limited statistical power to begin with, we cannot reliably disentangle these 
interaction effects from those related to firm size.  
 
V.  Discussion 
A.  Implications for Expected Returns and Arbitrage 
  We have framed our entire empirical analysis in terms of the level of stock prices.  But as 
a logical matter, our theory makes a corresponding set of predictions about stock returns.  In 
particular, a stock located in a region with a low value of RATIO should have a high price 
precisely because it has a low expected return.  Moreover, casting the tests in terms of expected 
returns would seem to have the added advantage of more fully controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity in future cashflows.  For example, if stocks located in the Deep South have higher 
prices, there is always the worry that this is in part because there is some missing Deep-South 
                                                 
25 In  a pooled Census-region specification analogous to that in Row 1 of Table 6, the coefficient on the interaction 
of RATIO and a no-megabrand dummy is -0.253, with a standard error of 0.147. 
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factor (e.g., hidden long-run growth potential) that will ultimately lead to higher cashflows and 
hence justify the higher prices.  If, however, Deep-South stocks have persistently lower returns, 
such an alternative hypothesis can be dismissed. 
  So why not look at returns instead of price levels?  The answer is that, since all risk 
premia in our model are permanent in nature, the sorts of price effects that we have documented 
translate into very small expected-return differentials—far too small to show up as statistically 
significant, given the power of such tests.
26  To see this concretely, think of a stock with a price-
earnings (P/E) ratio of 20.  In a simple perpetuity formula, this corresponds to a value of (k – g) 
of 5 percent, where k is the discount rate and g is the growth rate.  Now raise the price of the 
stock by 15 percent, so that the P/E goes to 23.   Relative to our price-level estimates in the 
previous section, this is a large increase, roughly corresponding to the extremes of the RATIO 
spectrum among smaller firms, or among electric utilities.   Yet even with this aggressive 
calibration, the implied value of  (k – g) only falls to 4.35 percent.  In other words, the expected 
return only drops by 65 basis points per year.
27 
  This same line of reasoning also sheds light on why arbitrage is unlikely to eliminate the 
price-level effects that we have documented.
28  To exploit the pricing discrepancies across 
regions, an arbitrageur would have to, e.g., buy the stocks of less-visible Middle-Atlantic firms, 
and short the stocks of less-visible Deep-South firms.  In doing so, he would incur substantial 
regional risk—the economy of the Deep South could boom unexpectedly relative to that of the 
                                                 
26 It is presumably for this same reason that the literature on index inclusion effects (initiated by Harris and Gurel 
(1986) and Shleifer (1986)) always looks at prices, rather than expected returns.  To the extent that any inclusion 
effect is both permanent and modest in magnitude, it makes little sense to test the hypothesis that, say, S&P 500 
stocks have lower expected returns than non-S&P 500 stocks. 
  
27 We have in fact tried the expected-return versions of our tests.  Not surprisingly, while the point estimates almost 
always go in the right direction—i.e., higher values of RATIO are generally associated with higher future returns—
none of these estimates are close to being statistically significant. 
 
28 See Petajisto (2004) for a related discussion.   31
Middle Atlantic, thereby devastating his position—all for an annualized alpha (before 
transactions costs) on the order of 65 basis points.  This hardly seems like an attractive trading 
strategy.  Thus in contrast to other, faster-converging phenomena like medium-term momentum 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)) or post-earnings-announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas 
(1989, 1990)), here we have a case where there are economically meaningful price-level effects, 
but little that would be of interest to a money manager.    
 
B.  International Asset Pricing with Segmented Markets 
  There is a clear parallel between our work and the literature on international asset pricing 
in the presence of segmented markets.  One major branch of this literature adopts a CAPM 
perspective, and asks whether expected returns on stocks in a given small country are driven by 
their betas with respect to the home-country market portfolio, or their betas with respect to the 
world market portfolio.
29  Typically, the home-country and world equity premia are taken as 
exogenous in these papers, and little effort is devoted to understanding their determinants.  In 
contrast, we completely ignore beta considerations: in our model, both the local-market and 
national-market betas of all stocks are effectively set equal to one.  Thus our analysis can be 
thought of as focusing exclusively on the determinants of average local-market equity premia.
30   
  It is natural to wonder what implications, if any, our results have for cross-country 
differences in asset prices.  At a general level, they would certainly seem to suggest that local-
market supply and demand factors can have meaningful consequences for price levels.  At the 
                                                 
29 Notable papers include Stulz (1981), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), Jorion and 
Schwartz (1986), Wheatley (1988), Hietala (1989), Bailey and Jagtiani (1994), and Chari and Henry (2004). 
 
30 In this regard, we are posing a question somewhat analogous to Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and Henry (2000).  
Both of these papers show that on average, prices go up—and equity premia presumably go down—when an 
emerging stock market is opened up to foreign investment. 
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same time, it would probably be naïve to run cross-country versions of our regressions—with 
country-wide analogs to the RATIO variable—and expect to get similar results.   
One obvious complicating factor has to do with differences across countries in financial 
development. For example, a country with weak investor protection is likely to have both lower 
stock prices (LaPorta et al (2002)) as well as fewer publicly-listed firms (LaPorta et al (1997)), 
and hence a lower value of RATIO.  To the extent that it is not possible to control perfectly for 
the degree of investor protection, this effect will tend to obscure the negative relationship 
between RATIO and stock prices that we observe in the U.S. data.  Said differently, we have 
seen that within the U.S., cross-region differences in RATIO are driven largely by variation in 
population density.  And we have argued that this sort of variation is plausibly exogenous with 
respect to the level of stock prices.  However, when one looks across countries, other factors 
(e.g., investor protection) are likely to play a much bigger role in influencing RATIO, and these 
other factors may well not be exogenous with respect to stock prices. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
The basic message of this paper is a simple one: like many other goods and services, 
stocks have prices that can be materially influenced by local supply and demand conditions.
31  
Just as one would expect the price of a hotel room to be lower in a city where hotel rooms are 
plentiful, so too is the price of a firm’s stock lower if it is located in a region where it must 
compete for investors’ dollars with many other nearby firms.  The magnitude of this effect is 
surprisingly large, especially among smaller, less-visible firms, where the implied price 
differentials across Census regions are as high as 12 percent. 
                                                 
31 This conclusion is very much in the spirit of Summers (1985). 
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In closing, we should stress two implications that our analysis does not have.  First, there 
is nothing in our results that suggests that any given firm can be made better off—in the sense of 
generating a higher stock price—by moving to a region with a lower value of RATIO.  Recall 
that every one of our specifications looks at the effect of the RATIO variable holding fixed firm 
profitability, as measured by ROE.  And it is obviously unlikely that a typical firm located in a 
high-RATIO state like New York could move to a low-RATIO state like West Virginia without 
adversely affecting its profitability. 
Second, in spite of the relatively large stock-price effects that we document, there is little 
here of interest to would-be arbitrageurs.  Given that location exerts a permanent influence on 
expected returns, it takes only a small rate-of-return wedge to generate the sorts of price-level 
differentials that we see in the data.  Thus any arbitrage strategy based on our findings is likely to 
have a very small alpha relative to the associated risks and transactions costs.  Indeed, it is for 
precisely this reason that even our most aggressive price-level estimates can be defended as 
economically plausible, since they do not suggest any easily exploitable arbitrage opportunities.    
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for RATIO, 1970-2001 
 
The entries are values of RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income (less dividends) in 
a given region. Panel A reports RATIO for the nine Census regions in every fifth year, starting in 1970,  
as well as the time-series means and standard deviations (using all the years, 1970-2001).  In addition, for 
each of the years shown, the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of RATIO are also reported.  
Panel B is similar to Panel A except that RATIO is reported at the state level for 48 states (Alaska and 
Hawaii are excluded.)  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics by Census Region 
 
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Mean S.D. 
           
New  England  0.75 0.94 0.97 0.81 0.76 0.84 0.91 0.87 0.08 
           
Middle  Atlantic  0.87 1.03 1.05 0.87 0.77 0.84 1.16 0.94 0.13 
           
Midwest  0.75 0.81 0.77 0.84 0.76 0.75 0.66 0.76 0.06 
           
Plains  0.25 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.50 0.69 0.42 0.12 
           
Atlantic  Coast  0.35 0.43 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.54 0.41 0.05 
           
Deep  South  0.07 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.14 0.29 0.50 0.21 0.13 
           
Southern  Plains  0.66 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.57 0.63 0.87 0.69 0.09 
           
Mountain  0.27 0.31 0.25 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.04 
           
West  Coast  0.33 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.78 0.44 0.10 
           
X-sectional  Mean  0.48 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.72     
           
X-sectional  S.D.  0.28 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.25     
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Panel B: Summary Statistics by State 
 
  1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Mean S.D. 
New  England           
         Connecticut  1.92  2.31 2.45 1.89 1.76 1.73 1.67 2.00  .26 
         Massachusetts  0.27 0.42 0.38 0.43 0.39 0.56 0.75  .46  .11 
         Maine  0.04  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.13  .07  .03 
         New Hampshire  0.12 0.19 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.22 0.11  .16  .04 
         Rhode Island  0.44 0.56 0.62 0.52 0.60 0.69 0.72  .61  .08 
         Vermont  -  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.11  .06  .05 
Middle  Atlantic           
         New Jersey  0.49  0.61 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.73  .58  .07 
         New York  1.14  1.36 1.46 1.17 1.05 1.16 1.71 1.28  .21 
         Pennsylvania  0.65  0.77 0.75 0.57 0.50 0.52 0.54  .61  .12 
M i d w e s t            
         Illinois  0.86  0.99 1.01 1.09 0.98 1.01 0.93  .99  .06 
         Indiana  0.09  0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.29  .20  .05 
         Michigan  1.41  1.34 1.08 1.28 1.28 1.01 0.61 1.13  .27 
         Ohio  0.52  0.61 0.67 0.68 0.48 0.59 0.69  .60  .09 
         Wisconsin  0.22  0.34 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.36 0.36  .31  .04 
P l a i n s            
         Iowa  0.05  0.10 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.16  .15  .05 
         Kansas  0.05  0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.15  .10  .03 
         Minnesota  0.40  0.55 0.59 0.55 0.46 0.60 0.68  .55  .07 
         Missouri  0.35  0.50 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.61 0.77  .55  .11 
         North Dakota  -  -  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.10  .03  .04 
         Nebraska  -  0.29 0.31 0.44 0.61 1.16 2.44  .78  .72 
         South Dakota  -  0.04 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.17  .06  .05 
Atlantic  Coast           
         Delaware  1.78  2.32 1.80 2.00 1.81 1.14 1.42 1.84  .38 
         District of Columbia  0.19 0.51 0.65 0.68 0.91 2.05 2.14 1.05  .70 
         Florida  0.20  0.26 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.26  .21  .05 
         Georgia  0.27  0.38 0.36 0.52 0.54 0.59 0.79  .50  .15 
         Maryland  0.26  0.30 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.27 0.31  .27  .02 
         North Carolina  0.27 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.27 0.51 0.89  .42  .20 
         South Carolina  0.08 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17  .13  .03 
         Virginia  0.74  0.76 0.69 0.68 0.59 0.61 0.52  .66  .09 
         West Virginia  -  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.05  .03  .03 
Deep  South           
          Alabama  0.04  0.11 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.40  .19  .11 
          Kentucky  0.10  0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.16  .17  .03 
          Mississippi  -  0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.18 1.35  .27  .45 
          Tennessee  0.07  0.19 0.19 0.20 0.13 0.36 0.41  .23  .11 
Southern  Plains           
          Arkansas  0.05  0.09 0.13 0.24 0.45 0.80 1.14  .41  .36 
          Louisiana  0.12  0.16 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.26 0.29  .20  .05 
          Oklahoma  0.53  0.57 0.57 0.27 0.22 0.30 0.51  .42  .14 
          Texas  0.89  1.02 0.95 0.83 0.71 0.72 0.98  .88  .12 
Mountain           
          Arizona  0.39  0.43 0.32 0.30 0.21 0.21 0.22  .29  .08 
          Colorado  0.31  0.43 0.32 0.62 0.62 0.50 0.54  .47  .11 
          Idaho  0.43  0.39 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.62  .41  .07 
          Montana  -  0.00 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.13  .05  .05 
          New Mexico  -  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.12  .07  .05 
          Nevada  0.06  0.11 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.37 0.33  .19  .10 
          Utah  0.21  0.27 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.32 0.19  .25  .04 
          Wyoming  -  -  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01  .01  .01 
West  Coast           
          California  0.37  0.43 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.50 0.78  .46  .10 
          Oregon  0.07  0.22 0.26 0.27 0.33 0.39 0.28  .27  .08 
          Washington  0.19  0.34 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.39 1.01  .38  .17 
Cross-sectional Mean  0.42  0.46 0.42 0.42 0.40 0.48 0.61     
Cross-sectional S.D.  0.46  0.51 0.48 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.55     
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Table 2: RATIO and its Components vs. Population Density, 1970-2001 
 
Each entry is the time-series mean of cross-sectional regression coefficients, estimated each year from 
1970-2001. The dependent variables include: i) the log of RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total 
personal income (less dividends) in a given region.; ii) the log of total book equity per capita in a region; 
and iii) the log of per capita income in a region.  Each of these variables is regressed one at a time against 
population density in a region.  In Panel A, all variables are measured at the Census-region level, and in 
Panel B, all variables are measured at the state level. 
 
 
Panel A:  Results by Census Region 
 











      
R-squared 0.41  0.48  0.31 
 
 
Panel B: Results by State 
 











      
R-squared 0.16  0.16  0.09   40
Table 3:  RATIO and Stock Prices, Detailed Results 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm.  The independent 
variables are RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income for the region in which the 
firm is located, along with the firm’s ratio of R&D to sales, and return on equity (ROE).  Also included in 
the regressions (but not shown) are a dummy variable which equals one if the firm does not report R&D 
expenditures, a set of 2-digit SIC industry dummies, and dummies for exchange listing (NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ).  Panel A reports the results for Census regions, and Panel B reports the results for states.  
Annual entries are the coefficients for RATIO, R&D to sales, and ROE, and the R-squareds of the cross-
sectional regressions by year.  Also reported are the time-series means of these  yearly coefficients, the 
Fama-MacBeth (serial-correlation-adjusted) standard errors, and the fraction of the years in which the 
regression coefficients have the predicted signs.  The last two lines of each panel report the results from: 
i) a single pooled regression in which the standard errors are clustered at the region level; ii) a collapsed 
regression in which there is only one averaged observation on residual log market-to-book for each 
region-year cell, and in which the standard errors are again clustered at the region level.  In the pooled 
regression, there are year dummies, and the coefficients on all control variables other than RATIO are 
allowed to vary by year. In the collapsed regression, there are only year dummies in addition to the 
RATIO variable.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Results by Census Region 
 
 
  RATIO  R&D to Sales  ROE  R-squared 
1970 -.049  8.01  2.98  0.46 
1971 -.136  8.45  2.63  0.42 
1972 -.074  8.65  3.63  0.48 
1973 -.132  10.2  2.99  0.41 
1974 -.133  8.01  1.70  0.33 
1975 -.076  7.85  2.46  0.45 
1976 -.083  6.71  2.26  0.42 
1977 -.042  4.76  2.07  0.42 
1978 -.084  5.00  2.22  0.45 
1979 -.046  7.55  1.78  0.43 
1980 -.094  5.80  2.07  0.49 
1981 -.191  6.86  1.71  0.39 
1982 -.086  3.70  1.26  0.33 
1983 -.134  1.74  1.14  0.35 
1984 -.107  1.40  1.04  0.31 
1985 -.083  .714  .852  0.28 
1986 -.043  .813  1.03  0.29 
1987 -.152  .565  .727  0.24 
1988 -.147  .280  .818  0.24 
1989 -.129  .308  .832  0.27 
1990 -.230  .749  1.07  0.30   41
1991 -.127  .938  1.17  0.33 
1992 -.107  .716  .806  0.28 
1993  .060 .452 .542 0.24 
1994 -.088  .477  .636  0.24 
1995 -.145  .661  .510  0.29 
1996 -.168  .698  .435  0.28 
1997 -.099  .508  .394  0.27 
1998 -.071  .463  .444  0.28 
1999 -.118  .673  .298  0.32 
2000 -.016  .626  .555  0.33 
2001 -.053  .283  .467  0.28 
Avg Annual Coeff.      -.099
***  3.27 1.36   
F-M standard error  (.008)  (3.05)  (1.20)   
# with correct sign  31/32  32/32  32/32   
      
Pooled Regression     -.097
*** 
(.029) 
-- --   
Collapsed 
Regression 
   -.092
*** 
(.030) 
-- --   
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Panel B: Results by State 
  RATIO  R&D to Sales  ROE  R-squared 
1970  -.008 8.03 2.98 0.46 
1971  -.052 8.42 2.63 0.41 
1972  -.044 8.61 3.63 0.48 
1973  -.051 10.2 2.98 0.41 
1974  -.045 7.99 1.71 0.33 
1975  -.018 7.84 2.47 0.44 
1976  -.015 6.70 2.27 0.42 
1977  -.010 4.77 2.08 0.42 
1978  -.039 5.00 2.23 0.45 
1979  -.030 7.52 1.78 0.43 
1980  -.035 5.78 2.08 0.49 
1981  -.088 6.81 1.72 0.39 
1982  -.034 3.69 1.26 0.33 
1983  -.076 1.75 1.14 0.35 
1984  -.039 1.41 1.04 0.31 
1985  -.059 .705 .849 0.28 
1986  -.039 .807 1.03 0.29 
1987  -.045 .568 .728 0.24 
1988  -.042 .280 .820 0.24 
1989  -.022 .315 .835 0.27 
1990  -.102 .754 1.08 0.30 
1991  -.086 .936 1.17 0.34 
1992  -.095 .710 .804 0.28 
1993  .017 .451 .540 0.24 
1994  -.048 .476 .636 0.24 
1995  -.049 .662 .508 0.29 
1996  -.044 .699 .436 0.28 
1997  -.018 .510 .395 0.27 
1998  .004 .463 .441 0.28 
1999  -.008 .673 .296 0.32 
2000  .025 .626 .556 0.33 
2001  -.038 .282 .464 0.28 
Avg Annual Coeff.      -.039
***  3.26 1.36   
F-M  standard  error  (.006) (3.07) (1.21)   
# with correct sign  29/32  32/32  32/32   
Pooled Regression  -.036
* 
(.019) 






-- --   
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Table 4: RATIO and Stock Prices, Alternative Specifications 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm.  In addition to the 
independent variables in Table 3, Row 2 adds region per capita income.  Row 3 adds region population 
density.  Row 4 adds the growth rate of region income from year t+1 to t+3. Row 5 adds the average firm 
ROE over years t+1 through t+3.  Row 6 adds the growth rate of firm sales from year t+1 to t+3. Row 7 
adds all the future controls in Rows 4-6 simultaneously.  Row 8 removes observations corresponding to 
industries that account for more than ten percent of total book value in a region. Row 9 adds a dummy for 
whether a firm is a conglomerate.  Row 10 adds the log of firms sales.  Row 11 adds a dummy for S&P 
500 index membership.  Panel A reports the results for Census regions, and Panel B reports the results for 
states.  All regressions are run using the pooled specification described in Table 3 with standard errors 
clustered at the region level.  Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by *, 
**, and ***, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Results by Census Region 
 
 RATIO  Future 








1.  Baseline Specification  -.097
*** 
(.029) 
    





    -.353 
(.719) 




    -.254
*** 
(.051) 







   

































    





    -.067
*** 
(.013) 
10.  Add Log Sales  -.099
*** 
(.028) 
    .017
** 
(.007) 
11.  Add S&P 500 Indicator   -.096
*** 
(.030) 
    .171
*** 
(.025)   44
 Panel B: Results by State 
 








1.  Baseline Specification  -.036
* 
(.019) 
    





    -.088 
(.179) 




    -.050
* 
(.029) 








   
































    




    -.067
*** 
(.013) 
10.  Add Log Sales  -.038
** 
(.019) 
    .017
*** 
(.005) 
11.  Add S&P 500 Indicator  -.035
* 
(.019) 
    .149
*** 
(.044)   45
 
 
Table 5:  RATIO and Stock Prices for Electric Utilities 
 
This table presents pooled regressions identical to those in Table 3, but restricted to a sample of electric 
utilities, defined as firms with SIC codes of either 4911 or 4931. The dependent variable is the log of the 
ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm.  We keep all the same controls as in Table 3, but display 
only the coefficient estimates for RATIO, the ratio of total book equity to total personal income for the 
region in which the firm is located.  The first row reports the results for Census regions, and the second 
row reports the results for states.  Standard errors are clustered at the region level.  Statistical significance 
at the ten, five and one-percent levels indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
  Coefficient on RATIO 




2.  States  -.051 
(.054) 
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Table 6:  Interaction of RATIO and Firm Size  
 
The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of market equity to book equity for a firm.  In addition to the 
independent variables in Table 3, each row adds a small-firm indicator (not shown) and the interaction of 
RATIO and the small-firm indicator.  The small firm indicator equals one if the firm’s sales are below the 
sample median value in a given year.  The regressions are run using the pooled specification described in 
Table 3 with standard errors clustered at the region level. Statistical significance at the ten, five and one-
percent levels indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 RATIO  RATIO×Small-Firm Indicator 
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Figure 1:  Scatterplots of Residual Log Market-to-Book vs. RATIO   
 
In each panel, we plot averages of residual log market-to-book against time-averaged values of RATIO at 
the Census-region level.  The residuals are based on cross-sectional regressions of log market-to-book 
against all the control variables in Table 3, excluding RATIO.  These residuals are then averaged both 
across firms in a Census region, and then over time, with the time interval varying across the panels in the 
figures.  In Panel A, the time averaging is done over the entire 1970-2001 sample period.  In Panels B-G, 
the time-averaging is done over the indicated subsample periods.  In Panel H, the time averaging is done 
over the entire 1970-2001 sample period, but we focus only on the subsample of electric utility firms.  
Census regions are indicated as follows on the plots: New England is NE;  Middle Atlantic is MA; 
Midwest is MW; Plains is PL; Atlantic Coast is AT; Deep South is  SO; Southern Plains is SP; Mountain 
is MT; and Pacific is PA.  In each panel, we display the coefficient from the nine-data-point regression of 
average residual log market-to-book against average RATIO, along with the associated standard error. 
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